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Abstract: Responding to Jean-Claude Gens’ article, “Uexküll’s Kompositionslehre and 
Leopold’s ‘land ethic’ in dialogue”, which appeared in Sign Systems Studies in 2013, the 
article further develops a direct connection between Aldo Leopold’s approach to eco-
logy and Jakob von Uexküll’s umwelt theory. The connection between Uexküll and 
Leopold is especially evident in Leopold’s descriptions of animal behaviour that he 
presents in the first part of his seminal work, A Sand County Almanac. In this work 
specifically, Leopold illustrates the biosemiotic processes described by Uexküll, and 
does so with a purpose: to reshape our understanding of the biotic community as a 
place of semiotic interaction.
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Jean-Claude Gens has recently argued in this journal for more deeply considering the 
intellectual affinity between Jakob von Uexküll’s umwelt theory and Aldo Leopold’s 
land ethic. Aldo Leopold and Jakob von Uexküll share the perspective that objects 
in the natural world possess a subjective meaning-making quality. Gens connects 
Uexküll’s interest in the “meaningful dimension of how the living apprehend their 
umwelt” with Leopold’s understanding of a biotic community wherein each member 
of that community (plants, animals, soil, etc) is meaningful to it (Gens 2013). For 
Uexküll, the biologist witnesses how organisms perceive and understand objects in 
their umwelten; for Leopold, the ecologist finds meaning-making activities generated 
through the interconnected processes that define a biotic community. Gens further 
connects Uexküll and Leopold through their shared interest in the Kantian concept of 
the numenon; Leopold discovered the concept indirectly through reading work by the 
vitalist philosopher Piotr Ouspensky (see Ouspensky 2004[1912]), whereas Uexküll 
was more directly familiar with Kant’s philosophical writings on the numenon. By 
understanding this connection more deeply, Gens argues, we can extend Uexküll’s 
doctrine of meaning into the realm of ethics and use Uexküll’s umwelt theory to deepen 
our understanding of Leopold’s land ethic. The argument is an important one, mapping 
out a common ground for both thinkers that intersects with the field of biosemiotics. 
Sign Systems Studies 44(1/2), 2016, 111–127
http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/SSS.2016.44.1-2.07
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I would extend the argument further. Namely, Uexküll and Leopold adopt the same 
approach in understanding how organisms interact in a given environment. Leopold’s 
affinity with Uexküll’s work, which has been primary to the field of biosemiotics, is 
deeper than a shared interest in Kant’s numenon, and that Leopold’s approach to 
ecology places him squarely in the tradition of biosemiotics. The connection between 
Uexküll and Leopold is even more directly evident in Leopold’s seminal work, A 
Sand County Almanac (Leopold 1987[1949]), and may be more central to Leopold’s 
ecological epistemology than any philosopher or critic has yet realized. 
Leopold’s biosemiotics: The influence of Uexküll and Peirce
Much of the formative work in biosemiotics is based in large part on the semiotics 
of Charles Sanders Peirce, and the biological contributions of Jakob von Uexküll.1 
Though Aldo Leopold illustrates a biosemiotic approach to studying nature in A 
Sand County Almanac, the question remains to what degree – if any – Leopold would 
have been familiar with the ideas and writings of Peirce, Jakob von Uexküll or the 
latter’s umwelt theory. Leopold does not reveal any direct influence from either Peirce 
or Uexküll in his own writings, which are copious and spread across his adult life. 
Because of this, it is hard to determine whether Leopold came across Uexküll’s work 
directly, but there is some evidence that shows he likely knew of it, and may have 
read Uexküll’s Umweltlehre and other works. One of the few copies of that work to 
be found in the United States during Leopold’s lifetime was held in the University of 
Wisconsin library where Leopold taught.2 Leopold grew up in a German-speaking 
family and read German fluently, so the fact that Uexküll’s works were not translated 
would not have been a hindrance. But Leopold would have also likely learned of 
Uexküll’s umwelt theory during his five-month sojourn in Germany in 1935. The trip 
brought him in contact with at least two people who could have aroused a curiosity in 
1 Th omas Sebeok and Th ure von Uexküll (Jakob von Uexküll’s son) have been the most 
prominent developers of this connection. Noting that Uexküll had no knowledge of Peirce, 
Saussure or general linguistics, semiotics explains the sign processes his umwelt theory 
describes: “As soon as it is clear to us that Umwelt-research explores the sign-processes that 
govern the behavior of living subjects even of cells, we can see that in fact there is a genuine 
analogy between linguistic and biological laws of formation that in the fi nal instance removes 
the distinction between the human and the natural sciences. [...] Th erefore, we may compare 
concepts such as system, structure, unity, etc., which the linguistic sciences provide, with the 
concepts of Umwelt theory because the linguistic concepts illustrate the concepts of Umwelt 
theory” (Uexküll, T. v. 1982: 8). 
2 Th e University of Wisconsin-Madison’s libraries held a number of Uexküll’s works, 
including Die Lebenslehre (1930), Biologische Briefe an eine Dame (1920), and the second 
edition of Th eoretische Biologie (1928).
 The biosemiotics of Aldo Leopold 113
Uexküll’s work. Franz Heske guided the group of American foresters and he singled 
out Leopold explicitly to accompany him on various trips to forest estates precisely 
because of the latter’s fluency in German. Heske was an avid promoter of the 
Dauerwald (sustainable forest) method of forest management, which quickly gained 
Leopold’s interest (Leopold 1935; 1936a). They shared another connection through 
Gifford Pinchot, whom Leopold knew as the former director of the Yale School of 
Forestry, and as his boss when Leopold worked for the U. S. Forest Service. Heske 
was a student of Dietrich Brandis, who in turn was Gifford Pinchot’s teacher and 
mentor early in Pinchot’s career (Miller 2001). As a young man, Heske worked on the 
very forest management projects in India for which Brandis was famous, and which 
figured prominently in Leopold’s study of forest management when a student at Yale.
That connection to Pinchot would have also made Leopold familiar with Peirce’s 
ideas when he was a student in Yale University’s School of Forestry founded by 
Pinchot. The Pinchots were neighbours and good friends of Peirce and his wife 
in Milford, New York. Leopold may have met Peirce at Grey Haven, as it was also 
the location of the School of Forestry’s summer school, where Leopold spent the 
summer in 1907 (Miller 2001). Peirce was also interested in the mission of the newly 
established School of Forestry, and had an impact on the younger Pinchot’s thoughts 
concerning forest management (Fisch 1982). If claims are made concerning the 
influence of Peirce on Leopold’s thought, they reference the impact of pragmatism 
(Minteer, Pyne 2013; Norton 2011; Callicott et. al. 2009). However, this debate 
ignores the significance of Peirce’s work on semiotics, which I would argue had an 
impact on Pinchot’s conception of forest management, and his interest in seeing 
environmental impacts as signs or symptoms of biotic health3 
However, it is Heske’s student, Arnold Freiherr von Vietinghoff-Riesch, who 
likely provides the more direct connection between Uexküll’s work and its influence 
upon Leopold.4 Vietinghoff-Riesch was a falconer, an engaged ornithologist, and the 
baron of a large family estate near Tharandt. Heske took Leopold to Vietinghoff-
Riesch’s estate in 1935, and it was there that Leopold was introduced to falconry. 
3 A semiotic approach to forestry, i.e. reading the forest for signs or symptoms of a disruption 
permeates Pinchot’s early books on forest management (cf. Pinchot 1905). Th e connection 
between Peirce, a friend and mentor to Pinchot and the semiotic aspects of Pinchot’s 
development of forestry science is a heretofore inadequately researched topic, and beyond the 
scope of this paper.
4 Uexküll (1940: 2) shows no tolerance for either the “Mechanists” or the “Behaviourists”, both 
of whom he considers guilty of tremendous over-simplifi cation in their scientifi c approach: “one 
can easily say that as experimental science becomes increasingly more complex, thought becomes 
increasingly simple and superfi cial” (my translation, R. P.) [So kann man wohl sagen, dass das 
Experimentieren immer komplizierter, das Denken aber immer einfacher und billiger geworden ist]. 
For a full critique of mechanistic science see Driesch’s Biologische Probleme höherer Ordnung (1941).
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The two men struck up a friendship that lasted for over a decade, exchanging their 
ideas concerning ecological forestry. Vietinghoff-Riesch had just completed his 
Habilitation under Heske’s direction, entitled Naturschutz, and later gave Leopold 
a copy. The work emphatically defends the Dauerwald concept, focusing on the 
importance of diverse plants and animals for maintaining forest health, which are 
usually considered insignificant or even noxious.
While Uexküll is not a direct source for Vietinghoff-Riesch’s Naturschutz, in that 
work Vietinghoff-Riesch describes an ecological system as a network wherein each 
organism performs a necessary function that suits it, and shows a similar interest 
in the semiotic activities of animals (Vietinghoff-Riesch 1936a: 118–128; 1936b). He 
sought to show how “pests” such as raptors, vermin and weeds are necessary to an 
ecosystem because of the ecological benefit that their function provides to a biotic 
community (Gemeinschaft), termed a role they each play. For Vietinghoff-Riesch, 
the interactions between these species enrich the diversity of the biotic community, 
which maintains its health and ensures its productivity (Steinsiek 2009: 255). Like 
Leopold in A Sand County Almanac, Vietinghoff-Riesch portrays fauna as various 
community members, each acting and interacting in its environment, also using 
terms such as plant or animal “sociology” and “Biologie des Waldes” (Vietinghoff-
Riesch 1936b: 118; 1940: 11–17). Leopold was so impressed with Vietinghoff-Riesch’s 
approach to ecology that upon his return to the United States he encouraged the 
Oberlaender Trust to translate and publish Naturschutz for an American audience 
(Leopold 1936b5).6
Kalevi Kull articulates a paradigmatic distinction in biosemiotics, which lies in 
a resistance to a purely mechanistic approach that discounts subjectivity. For Kull, 
this opposition is a continuation of a general theoretical divide stretching back to the 
division between Kepler and Newton, Goethe and Kant, and Baer and Darwin (Kull 
1999). Uexküll vociferously rejected the mechanistic trend in evolutionary biology 
promoted by his contemporary Ernst Haeckel, while Vietinghoff-Riesch (1936a: 120–
122) places himself in the vitalist camp. Leopold’s enthusiasm in Vietinghoff-Riesch’s 
work further indicates the affinity between his approach to ecology as a discipline 
and the vitalism that informs Uexküll’s umwelt theory. Leopold was exposed to 
a discussion among foresters and natural scientists emerging from a vitalist as 
5 Leopold 1936b was accessed at http://images.library.wisc.edu/AldoLeopold/EFacs/
ALWildEcol/ALWildEcolO-R/reference/aldoleopold.alwildecolor.i0001.pdf.
6 In his autobiography, Letzter Herr auf Neschwitz, Vietinghoff -Riesch (2002[1952]: 211–212)
briefl y discusses these visits from American foresters, and especially the reaction of the owners 
of large lumber companies when visiting his small-scale, ‘kahlschlaglosen’ forest. Leopold’s 
fl uency in German facilitated their friendship, and Vietinghoff -Riesch visited the Leopolds 
aft er the war. 
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opposed to mechanistic approach to the scientific study of nature. Gens finds in 
this connection a link to Uexküll’s thought, and Leopold’s interest in Vietinghoff-
Riesch’s work that is firmly placed in the same school of thought bears this out. What 
emerged was Leopold’s development of an environmental ethics that regards the non-
human other as an intentional subject.
Reading nature: An ecology of semiosis
However, the most relevant way to observe how Leopold illustrates the biosemiotic 
processes described by Uexküll, appears in A Sand County Almanac. Leopold does so 
with a purpose: to reshape our very understanding of the biotic community as a place 
of semiotic interaction. 
Biosemiotics challenges the assumption that only human beings understand 
and interact with their world through communication. Jesper Hoffmeyer (2008: 
4) provides a succinct definition: “According to the biosemiotic perspective, living 
nature is understood as essentially driven by, or actually consisting of semiosis, 
that is to say, processes of sign relations and their signification – or function – in 
the biological processes of life”. Semiotic processes (semiosis) refers to the neuro-
biological capacity to consistently produce and comprehend perceptual input 
through a codifiable process (Sebeok, Danesi 2000: 5, 161). Leopold illustrates the 
com mu nicative beha viour of living creatures in a shared environment, showing how 
organisms make meaning of their world. He then makes the case that possessing 
an understanding those communicative behaviours benefits the ecologist and the 
land-owner alike. And while fundamentally separate and different from the semiotic 
complexity exhibited in human communities, semiotic practices of animals – and 
plants – open up a rich world of interactions the ecologist can observe, puzzle over, 
and enjoy. 
A Sand County Almanac is divided into three parts: In the first part, the almanac 
section of the book, Leopold describes what he observes on and around “the 
Shack”, a run-down piece of property he purchased through a bank foreclosure and 
was attempting to restore (Flader 1987). In the second part, he narrates specific 
moments in his life that shaped his ecological thinking; Leopold’s renowned essay 
“Thinking like a mountain” is found in this section. The third part contains a series 
of more philosophical essays in which Leopold grapples with central problems facing 
environmental conservation, and considers those problems from political, aesthetic, 
and ethical perspectives; this section concludes with his essay “The land ethic”, 
which has been used by philosophers such as Baird Callicott and others to develop a 
nonanthropocentric environmental ethic (Callicott 1999; Gens 2013). 
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The first part – the almanac section of A Sand County Almanac – has received the 
least amount of critical interest, and yet is the most detailed in revealing Leopold’s 
practice as an ecologist.7 The various sketches of animal activity and plant functions 
in the first part of A Sand County Almanac illustrate the ecologist at work, attempting 
to interpret the myriad semiotic processes he observes. It opens with its narrator 
(Leopold) following the tracks of a skunk. It is January, and a warm spell followed 
by a snow thaw, typical for that time of year in Wisconsin, has triggered a variety of 
natural activities, such as the nocturnal sojourn of a skunk that would normally be in 
hibernation. Leopold (1987[1949]: 3) writes:
Each year, after the midwinter blizzards, there comes a night of thaw when the 
tinkle of dripping water is heard in the land. It brings strange stirrings, not only 
to creatures abed for the night, but to some who have been asleep for the winter. 
The hibernating skunk, curled up in his deep den, uncurls himself and ventures 
forth to prowl the wet world, dragging his belly in the snow. His track marks one 
of the earliest datable events in that cycle of beginnings and ceasings, which we 
call a year. 
Notably, the presence of a skunk track precipitated by the January thaw is a repeatable 
occurrence that marks a mid-winter transition. On one level, Leopold is illustrating 
to his reader what this track signifies or means to him as a “literate” reader of the 
natural world who can read objects such as the skunk track as “signs” (Ryden 2008; 
Talmadge 1987). He thus models for his own human reader how to become literate in 
another kind of reading a phenomenon in the natural world – like the skunk track – 
as a “mark” or sign that announces the beginning of the year. 
Rydan and Tallmadge have effectively illustrated how extensively Leopold uses the 
act of reading as a metaphor for the practice of a land steward or ecologist, which this 
passage illustrates. Yet by focusing on the ecologist as a literate reader of nature, we 
miss Leopold’s characterization of the skunk as a subject deriving meaning from the 
changes it perceives around it. In attempting to discover what stimulates the skunk’s 
journey, wondering what “this corpulent fellow” (Leopold 1987[1949]: 3) could have 
been up to on a January night, Leopold (1987[1949]: 5) constructs how the skunk 
senses and responds to its world, obviously trying to create the subjective world of 
the skunk:
7 Finch (1987: xix) characteristically refl ects the view that Part I is the least notable of the 
three sections when he writes in his introduction to the Oxford edition of A Sand County 
Almanac: “If A Sand County Almanac had included only the shack essays of Part I, it would 
have been a slim, minor classic of graceful and perceptive natural-history narratives”. Instead, 
due to the essays in Parts II and III, “no other single book of American nature writing – with 
the exception of Walden – has achieved such lasting stature” (Finch 1987: xv).
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The skunk track leads on, showing no interest in possible food, and no concern 
over the rompings or retributions of his neighbors. I wonder what he has in his 
mind; what got him out of bed? Can one impute romantic motives to this corpulent 
fellow, dragging his ample beltline through the slush? Finally the track enters a pile 
of driftwood, and does not emerge. I hear the tinkle of dripping water among the 
logs, and I fancy the skunk hears it too. I turn homeward, still wondering. 
Leopold seeks to understand the signs that have meaning to a skunk and thus 
delineate its world. What impulse spurred the skunk’s actions? How are the perceived 
change in temperature and the skunk’s sojourn connected? As Leopold asks, what 
did the skunk have “in his mind”? The mystery remains, however, which Leopold 
then turns into a narrative opportunity to reveal how the semiotic processes found in 
nature’s text remaining untranslated. 
Leopold’s ecological practice is reflected again when, while following the skunk 
track, he spots a meadow mouse crossing in front of him. He asks himself why the 
mouse would be abroad in daylight? Of course, on one level this illustrates how an 
ecologist attentively observes the biotic activity around him. What follows, however, 
is a biosemiotic investigation into the communicative properties of interaction 
that delineate the umwelt of the mouse. Leopold first extrapolates how the mouse 
perceives the snowmelt: The melting snow has wreaked havoc upon its domain, 
which leads to the rash action of exposing itself to predators, “[p]robably because 
he [the mouse] feels grieved about the thaw”. Leopold further extrapolates how the 
mouse may be perceiving his umwelt: “Today his maze of secret tunnels laboriously 
chewed through the matted grass under the snow, are tunnels no more, but only 
paths exposed to public view and ridicule”. Leopold then configures perception as 
the locus for the mouse-subject to make meaning of its world: “The mouse is a sober 
citizen who knows that grass grows in order that mice may store it as underground 
haystacks, and that snow falls in order that mice may build subways from stack to 
stack: supply, demand, and transport all neatly organized” (Leopold 1987: 4). That 
“knowing” is derived from the perceptive faculties of the mouse, which in turn 
determine the internal formation of its particular umwelt.
Similarly, Uexküll argues that any living organism capable of perceiving the 
external world in which it functions (its umwelt) also exhibits different modelling 
strategies for processing and monitoring sensory perception, depending on the 
organism’s biological and physiological capabilities, what he called its Innenwelt (all 
that is internal to it). Perception is fundamentally shaped by the mouse’s physiology 
and biological programming, the particular Innenwelt of a mouse, determined as it is 
by its anatomy, the complexity of its brain and nervous system, its sensory capacities, 
it experiential processes that result from function in a given environment, to name 
just a few of the complex web of factors involved in semiosis. 
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An organism’s umwelt is a world of signs perceived and embodied with meaning 
through its Innenwelt. In this sense, a particular umwelt constitutes a system of 
responses to the objects that the organism perceives, while at the same time those 
responses reveal what meaning those perceived objects hold for that particular 
creature. Objects gain or change meaning through an organism’s interaction with 
them, which in turn creates experience that can shape how an organism/subject 
understands a sign/object (Uexküll, J. v. 1913). The mouse sees the snow thaw 
within the frame of meaning that emerges out of instinctual and environmentally 
determined practices and habits of the mouse. These interactions reflect how the 
mouse perceives an object as a sign, in other words, as an object with a meaning. 
 Uexküll’s umwelt theory is based on the premise that meaning fundamentally 
captures the development and function of an organism (Uexküll, J. v. 1982: 37). It 
is only by studying these interactions that we can determine causal connections 
between physiognomy, activity and biotic function in a systemic way. A search for 
understanding these connections is structuring Leopold’s observations as he follows 
the skunk, observes the mouse, and then, a few moments later, sees a rough-legged 
hawk that makes a raptor’s dive into the snow. Leopold again asks what in its umwelt 
triggers the hawk’s dive? The hawk remains on the ground, and Leopold surmises 
that it caught a mouse: “He does not rise again, so I am sure he has caught, and is 
now eating, some worried mouse-engineer who could not wait until night to inspect 
the damage to his well-ordered world” (Leopold 1987: 4). Leopold then contrasts how 
grass and snow mean something different for the mouse and the hawk, emphasizing 
both their subjective responses to the same phenomenon, the melted snow. Their 
activity is explained in a way that correlates with Uexküll’s umwelt theory: as a 
schematic relationship between the subject’s sensual organs (Merkorgane) and the 
objects that a subject perceives, which function as signs. Physical action is predicated 
upon sensual perception. 
Leopold captures the separation of and interconnection between each subject’s 
umwelten in this interplay between mouse and hawk. What is striking, however, is the 
similarity between Leopold’s descriptions of biotic activity and Uexküll’s descriptions 
of biotic activity, both highly emphasizing semiosis. Leopold’s illustrations capture 
Uexküll’s concept of umwelten, which consists of those objects significant to a 
specific subject (Uexküll, J. v. 1980: 136). For example, Uexküll writes, “The meaning 
of the forest is multiplied a thousand fold if its relationships are extended to animals 
and not limited to human beings”, and to illustrate his point he examines the many 
ways a blooming wildflower is perceived by four different subjects: a girl, an ant, 
a cicada-larva, and a cow. Uexküll uses the example to illustrate what he calls the 
relationship-network of the four umwelten, which is established by the role of each 
subject: 
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(1)  In the Umwelt of a girl picking flowers, who gathers herself a bunch of 
colorful flowers she uses to adorn her bodice;
(2)  In the Umwelt of an ant, which uses the regular design of the stem-surface 
as the ideal path in order to reach its food-area in the flower petals;
(3)  In the Umwelt of a cicada-larva, which bores into the sap-paths of the stem 
and uses it to extract the sap in order to construct the liquid walls of its airy 
house;
(4)  In the Umwelt of a cow, which grasps the stems and the flowers in order to 
push them into its wide mouth and utilizes them as fodder.
Just as the hawk and mouse hold different meanings for snow, all of these subjects 
have their own particular meaning for a flower based on its use to them. The girl uses 
flowers as an adornment, because she perceives flowers as colourful and aesthetically 
pleasing. We see the same interaction in the ant, the cicada-larva and the cow:
The picking of the flower transforms it into an ornamental object in the girl’s 
world. Walking along the stem changes the stem into a path in the ant’s world, 
and when the cicada-larva pierces the stem, it is transformed into a source 
for building material. By grazing, the cow transforms the flower stem into 
wholesome fodder.
Every action, therefore, that consists of perception and operation imprints its 
meaning on the meaningless object and thereby makes it into a subject-related 
meaning-carrier in the respective Umwelt. (Uexküll, J. v. 1982: 29–31)
Use lies at the centre of these different meanings; grass grows for the mouse’s grain 
storage, and snow melts so that hawks can catch mice. Use is thus concomitant to 
function. In other words, snow has a use for the mouse in providing cover from the 
hawk because, from the perspective of the mouse, snow functions as cover from 
predators. And this function is embedded in how the mouse perceives snow – as an 
effective shelter from hawks – which creates a meaning particular to the mouse: “To 
the mouse snow means freedom from want and fear”, while “the rough-leg has no 
opinion why grass grows, but he is well aware that snow melts in order that hawks 
may again catch mice. He came down out of the Arctic in the hope of thaws, for to 
him a thaw means freedom from want and fear” (Leopold 1987: 4). Leopold thus 
presents in this comparison a triadic semiosis wherein snow is an indexical sign 
interpreted consistently but differently by two subjects. 
This comparison of the mouse and hawk illustrates a model for biological 
interaction that is in line with the umwelt theory of Uexküll in a number of ways. It 
shares with the umwelt theory the position that an organism is an autonomous subject 
possessing certain capabilities of perception; in complex organisms perception is a 
neural activity, and in simpler ones, usually a chemical one. An organism perceives 
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the material world in which it lives, and then orders those perceptions in a way that 
gives them a meaning, or significance. What a specific organism “understands”, what is 
meaningful or significant to it, is indeed primarily based on its physiology. 
This act of modelling for his reader how to actively interpret objects in nature 
as signs reveals Leopold’s engagement with semiotics in his approach to ecology. 
He incorporates a way of analysing animal interactions that illustrates the semiotic 
processes of active relations between organisms and their environment. For the 
purpose of diagnosis, the one-time occurrence holds little interest to the ecologist 
diagnosing tell-tale signs of change. It is only through recurrent manifestation that an 
observation becomes symptomatic and predicative of a certain condition. That aspect 
of ecology is poignantly expressed in “The round river: A parable” where Leopold 
(1991: 165) writes:
One of the penalties of an ecological education is that one lives alone in a world 
of wounds. Much of the damage inflicted on land is quite invisible to laymen. An 
ecologist must either harden his shell and make believe that the consequences 
of science are none of his business, or he must be the doctor who sees the marks 
of death in a community that believes itself well and does not want to be told 
otherwise.8 
Leopold shows his reader how he attempts to translate the semiotic activities within 
a land community that present themselves as consistent marks to be read and 
interpreted. This is the almanac quality of A Sand County Almanac, which also pro-
vides a model for another aspect of the ecologist’s work, to recognize the signs of a 
functioning ecosystem, so that deviations or symptoms of change can be spotted, and 
hopefully cured. 
The ecologist as translator: 
The language of a biotic community
Reconstructing a subjectivity for individual members of a biotic community (skunk, 
mouse, hawk) is of particular importance to Leopold’s study of nature because it 
indicates how semiotic processes provide insight into animal behaviour in a given 
8 An ecologist as diagnostic physician has a longer history, dating to 19th-century European 
forestry, and promoted by the founder of the Yale School of Forestry, Giff ord Pinchot. Th ere is 
some evidence that C. S. Peirce, a friend of Pinchot and his family, also may have infl uenced 
how Pinchot envisioned the work of the forester that he articulates in Th e Training of a Forester 
(Pinchot 1917). Th e concept of a symptom as a sign for change or disease in a “body” stretches 
back to Hippocrates (who coined the term ʽsemiotik’), and continues to be a part of medical 
practice in various ways (see Ots 1991: 283–5; Sebeok 1984: 37–42). 
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environment and is representative of a working ecosystem. In this way Leopold is 
interested in just that biosemiotic activity which Giorgio Prodi (1989: 95) calls 
reading and which is somewhat different from the “reading” discussed above. 
Leopold’s own depiction of the ecologist-as-diagnostician stresses reading the signs of 
nature as symptomatic. Yet, while he does practice those types of semiotic activities, 
he goes further in trying to figure out how the non-human members of the biotic 
community are reading their own worlds. 
 For example, in the final chapter of the almanac section, “December”, Leopold 
engages in this very question concerning how the animals living on his property 
perceive their place. What is their geography? He distinguishes how their actions 
reveal an answer:
The wild things that live on my farm are reluctant to tell me, in so many words, 
how much of my township is included within their daily or nightly beat. I am 
curious about this, for it gives me the ratio between the size of their universe and 
the size of mine, and it conveniently begs the much more important question, 
who is the more thoroughly acquainted with the world in which he lives? 
Like people, my animals frequently disclose by their actions what they decline 
to divulge in words. (Leopold 1987: 78) 
Leopold then presents different scenarios that reveal the home range of a variety of 
animals: a jack rabbit, chickadees, grouse, and deer that all reside on “The Shack”. 
When his dog flushes a jack rabbit while Leopold is chopping wood, he notices how the 
rabbit “makes a beeline for a woodpile a quarter-mile distant, where he ducks between 
two corded stacks, a safe gunshot ahead of his pursuer”. Seeing the jack rabbit get away 
Leopold observes, “The little episode tells me that this rabbit is familiar with all of the 
ground between his bed in the meadow and his blitz-cellar under the woodpile. How 
else the beeline? This rabbit’s home range is at least a quarter-mile in extent”. He then 
compares the rabbit’s beeline to the nocturnal route of three deer that he constructs by 
retracing their tracks; they leave their beds located in a willow thicket on a sandbar and 
cut across Leopold’s property, then eat the waste corn in a neighbour’s cornfield, then 
loop back to the sand bar pawing at some tufts of grass en route and drinking from 
a spring. “My picture of the night’s routine is complete” Leopold writes, “The overall 
distance from bed to breakfast is a mile”. Observing the signs of grouse activity in 
winter he discovers that rather than wade through soft snow, the birds walk along fallen 
logs to a patch of frozen night shade berries then fly to their roosts, “and the range was 
half a mile across” (Leopold 1987[1949]: 78–81). 
In each case, the animal in question reveals an intentional action based on a 
subjective understanding of its umwelt, what Leopold at this juncture calls its universe 
or its world. The woodpile is an object in the rabbit’s umwelt that has a particular 
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meaning based on its use; it provides shelter from a predator. The deer follow a 
determined path based on their knowledge of their specific home range, and so do the 
grouse. In semiotic terms, they reveal a level of literacy derived from being schooled in 
survival. When the ecologist can penetrate the subjective world of the rabbit by figuring 
out what objects have meaning for it, he is translating the rabbit’s “book”, which is how 
Leopold describes the process at the end of the segment: “Every farm is a textbook on 
animal ecology; woodsmanship is the translation of the book” (Leopold 1987[1949]: 
81). Translation, however, indicates that the text (what is being translated) is the umwelt 
of the rabbit, deer, grouse, and the semioses generated in those umwelten. 
The ongoing and enjoyable work of translating brings its own insights. Ecology 
is the task of the translator, working with the signs she has to determine what holds 
meaning for another (non-human) subject, and what that meaning might be. Uexküll 
casts the task of the translator in a similar vein Uexküll argues observation of the 
natural world requires the human observer to seek out two aspects of any interaction 
between an organism and its umwelt. First is the task of determining the perceptive 
attributes of that organism, what it perceives and how those perceptions manifest 
in its Innenwelt. Then the scientist can decipher the myriad of meaning-making 
activities within a biotic community. 
Translation recasts a common understanding of Leopold’s ecological practice 
as exhibited in the almanac in two key ways. First, it heightens awareness of how 
consistent Leopold’s method is with biosemiotics. Second, it asks us to rethink these 
sketches commonly interpreted as entertaining characterizations, and therefore 
anthropomorphic in quality, and to reexamine them in light of a more radical 
understanding of autonomy and subjectivity extended to the non-human – one that 
is informed by biosemiotics. 
The way an organism experiences its umwelt also reveals its abilities and habits, 
and when found in a narrative form, such as is the case in A Sand County Almanac, 
its character. Character is a contentious term in this context. In narrative, animal 
behaviours are habitually understood as expressions of character, and it would be 
easy to read Leopold’s description of the mouse, the hawk, and the skunk in this 
light. The mouse is acting mouse-like, and the hawk, hawk-like, just as a villain in 
a fairy tale acts villainously and a hero, heroically. But what constructs the mouse-
like or hawk-like character? Jesper Hoffmeyer (2008: xiii) asks an intriguing question 
that is also central to Leopold’s interest in the skunk: “How can we be so sure that 
these animals themselves – as environmentally situated organisms of blood, flesh, 
and brain – take no creative part in their own behavior?”. While not refuting the 
evolutionary explanation for much of animal behaviour, Hoffmeyer articulates an 
assumption of Uexküllʼs: living creatures, especially those with more complex neural 
systems, exhibit behaviours that are not adequately described in a purely mechanistic 
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fashion. Animals exhibit intentions, which are shaped by their experience of the 
environment in which they live. Hoffmeyer uses a term that aptly describes Leopold’s 
approach to an ecological understanding of nature, that of “natural play” (as opposed 
to “natural selection”) discoverable in a given biotic community. The play between 
species can be seen in the myriad of activities carried out continually within that 
striving community. According to Hoffmeyer (2008: xiv), “Making scientifically 
responsible sense of this “striving” is one of the challenges that the emerging scientific 
field called biosemiotics sets out to accept”. 
Biosemiotics posits that an organism’s capability of semiosis necessitates an 
intentional act. Clearly, Leopold illustrates how the animals he observes show 
intention, and how that intention is seen in the way the objects are signs in their 
subjective worlds. Yet is it too much to assume intentional striving in the skunk? 
One could reply that any narrative will necessitate intentions in its characters. Once 
people use human language to describe the natural world – once the things in that 
world become actors – intentions among those actors in that world will magically 
appear. In other words, a thing cannot be a subject or character unless it exhibits 
intention, or inversely, once a person articulates a thing as a character it will have 
an intention. When a white blood cell is described as attacking a virus, or a hawk 
hunting for a mouse, intent is manifest in the blood cell or in the hawk. This is a 
transitive limitation of descriptive narrative that makes any discussion of semiotics in 
any subject other than the human subject very difficult. 
Leopold does seem to make an attempt to overcome this difficulty by contrasting 
the imbedded meaning the same object holds for two different animals, and how 
various animals (including Leopold himself) perceive and understand the same 
space. There is no shared communication enabled by place, which is inherent to an 
anthropomorphic characterization; rabbit, grouse, skunk, and man are all subjectively 
contained by the semiotic process of their subjective worlds. The mouse and hawk 
do not “speak” to each other through their actions. In fact, it is the limitation of the 
mouse’s umwelt that puts it in danger of the hawk; limited to its mouse world, the 
mouse cannot perceive what snowmelt means for the hawk – a great opportunity to 
catch a mouse!9 Completely outside of this transaction between mouse and hawk is 
the ecologist, a translator in this case, whose involvement is only through the act of 
description. However, the semiotic processes he interprets come from the actions of 
9 Weber clarifi es this issue in light of Uexküll’s Umwelt Th eory, emphasizing how Uexküll 
was certain that the natural world consisted of individual organisms, each in its own “soap 
bubble”, yet interconnected through a complex web of interactions that defi ne their perceptions 
of that world (see Weber 2003: 97; see also Uexküll, J. v. 1926: 42). I would argue that the 
shared focus on what the soap bubble of each organism contains also enables both Leopold and 
Uexküll to redefi ne the subject in such a way as to allow for the subject’s intrinsic value 
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the mouse and the hawk, respectively, each functioning within their respective umwelt. 
Even when conveyed through a human narrator, intention originates in them. 
Yet is not the ecologists’ translation subject to the human a propensity to use 
metaphors, in this case metaphors of communication, speaking, reading, performing, 
in order to describe animal behaviour better to a lay audience?10 By using terms such 
as ‘meaning’ or ‘performance’ to explain animal interactions, does Leopold engage in 
just another type of anthropomorphic characterization? 
Answering yes to these questions would still point to how Leopold depicts a 
particularly situated way of seeing, but the view is necessarily located in the human 
observer. It would assume that the activities of other organisms remain a mystery to 
the human subject, and this gulf can only be bridged by symbolic language. Metaphor 
would be the tool for building that bridge, while creating those metaphors would 
constitute a practice in aesthetics rather than scientific observation. There is some 
evidence in Leopold’s work to substantiate this position. Leopold uses slave ownership 
and liberation as analogies to preface his call for an ethic extended to non-human 
nature (Leopold 1987: 201–3). In the almanac section he constructs an elaborate 
metaphor of an ancient oak tree as a chronicler of past events (Leopold 1987: 6–18). 
The geese engage in international commerce, and the crane is a reminder of a natural 
history that stretches far longer than our human one (Leopold 1987: 23, 96). 
Yet, while Leopold clearly loves to spin metaphors out of the fabric of what he 
observes, he also carefully constructs depictions of animal activity as iconic or indexical 
semiotic processes that are only made symbolic when viewed through the human 
lens. In this sense Leopold tacitly models what Susanne Langer (1948) referred to as 
‘abstractive seeing’, using the image schemas he derives from ecological observation 
to create a more complex and meaningful language for reading nature. The members 
of the biotic community that populate the Shack engage in life activities that show 
intention and interpretation as distinctly different from the symbolic language of 
human beings. And rather than enfold animal behaviour into metaphor, Leopold’s 
deliberate and highly constructed use of metaphor effectively separates the human 
observer from the biotic activities around him. Metaphor functions then as a way of 
distinguishing his own human semiotic processes as narrator from the non-human 
semiotic processes he describes occurring among non-human subjects. 
10 Th is is a challenge facing the fi eld of biosemiotics, more aware than most disciplines of 
the power of metaphor to shape meaning. Both Th ure von Uexküll (1982) and Hoff meyer 
(2008) make the point that, as Hoff meyer (2008: xv) states, “biosemiotics is oft en dismissed by 
scholars – not least, those from the humanities – who fundamentally misconceive the project 
as an attempt to project anthropomorphic features upon an existing world”. Th is tendency to 
read Leopold’s descriptions of animal behaviour as anthropomorphic characterization is likely 
why the biosemiotic aspect of his observations has gone unnoticed.
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There is still a great amount of work to be done in connecting early twentieth-
century thought in forestry and ecology to the field of biosemiotics. Examining Aldo 
Leopold’s descriptions of animal behaviour is a first step in showing how not only his 
practice as an ecologist, but also his philosophical conviction that members of a biotic 
community are subjects capable of intentionality are in line with Jakob von Uexküll’s 
umwelt theory and subsequent work in biosemiotics. Sense and intention seem to 
necessitate semiosic processes that indicate that an organism is a subject capable of 
intention. Many of Leopold’s intellectual pursuits in A Sand County Almanac are aimed 
at finding out what not only the intention, but also what the intentional object in an 
organism’s umwelt could be. Manifesting an intentional object is for Leopold an act 
of interpretation, it places the iconic and indexical signs sensed by organisms in the 
natural world into a symbolic contextualized relationship that facilitates ecological 
understanding. As such, determining the umwelt of an organism is an act of translating, 
and takes as its basis the inseparability between a non-human subject and its world. 
Gens (2013: 76) points out that, “the holism found in Uexküll’s and Leopold’s 
ideologies has a direct effect on the way they conceive the relationship linking 
humanity to nature”, which demands that we broaden our sense of what it means to 
belong to a community. Generally in clarifying this notion of community philosophy 
has focused on the concept of belonging, citizenship, and value. A biosemiotic analysis 
of Uexküll and Leopold in tandem uncovers and fruitful, and perhaps more definitive, 
understanding of community in this context: as the interconnective web of semiotic 
practices engaged by each subject in a certain biotic sphere; in other words, as a place 
of meaning.
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Биосемиотика Альдо Леопольда
Отвечая на статью Jean-Claude Gens «Uexküll’s Kompositionslehre and Leopold’s ‘land 
ethic’ in dialogue», опубликованную в Sign Systems Studies в 2013 году, автор исследует 
прямую связь между пониманием экологии Леопольда и теорией умвельта Юкскюля. 
Связь между ними особенно заметна в описаниях поведения животных, которые 
Леопольд приводит в первой части своей выдающейся книги «A Sand County Almanac». 
Именно в этом произведении Леопольд целенаправленно иллюстрирует описанные 
Юкскюлем биосемиотические процессы, чтобы изменить наше понимание о биоти-
ческих со общест вах как местах семиотических интеракций. 
Aldo Leopoldi biosemiootika
Vastusena Jean-Claude Gensi artiklile “Uexkülli Kompositionslehre ja Leopoldi land ethic 
dialoogis. Tähenduse mõistest”, mis ilmus ajakirjas Sign Systems Studies aastal 2013, arenda-
takse käesolevas artiklis edasi otsest seost Aldo Leopoldi ökoloogilise lähenemise ja Jakob von 
Uexkülli omailmateooria vahel. Side Uexkülli ja Leopoldi vahel on eriti märgatav Leopoldi 
peateose “A Sand County Almanac” esimeses osas, millest võib leida loomade käitumise 
kirjeldusi. Just selles teoses illustreerib Leopold biosemiootilisi protsesse, mida oli kirjeldanud 
Uexküll, ning ta teeb seda sihipäraselt, et kujundada ümber meie arusaama kooslustest kui 
semiootiliste interaktsioonide toimumispaigast.
